We use a large, rich Canadian micro-level dataset to examine the channels through which family socio-economic status and unobservable characteristics affect children's decisions to drop out of high school. Our data suggest that teenage boys with two parents who are themselves high school dropouts have a 16% chance of dropping out, compared to a dropout rate of less than 1% for boys whose parents both have a university degree. We develop and estimate an extended version of the factor model set out in Carneiro et al. (2003) in which we identify the impact of cognitive and non-cognitive ability, as well as the value that parents place on education. Our results support three main conclusions. First, cognitive ability at age 15 has a substantial impact on dropping out. The highest ability individuals are predicted never to drop out regardless of parental education or parental valuation of education. In contrast, the lowest ability teenagers have a probability of dropping out of approximately .36 if their parents have a low valuation of education. Second, parental valuation of education has a substantial impact on medium and low ability teenagers. A low ability teenager has a probability of dropping out of approximately .03 if his parents place a high value on education but .36 if their educational valuation is low. These effects are estimated while conditioning on ability (as of age 15) and they reflect parental influences during the upper teenage years, above and beyond any impact they might have had in the early development leading up to age 15. Third, parental education has no direct effect on dropping out once we control for ability and parental valuation of education. Overall, our results confirm the importance of whatever determines ability by age 15 (such as early childhood interventions) but they also hint at an important role for parental valuation of education during the teenage years. Finally, our model presents a small methodological contribution by extending the standard unobserved-factor estimator to allow for a non-linear relationship between the factors and some co-variate of interest. We show that allowing for such non-linearities has a very substantial impact on estimates.
Introduction
The strong correlation between family socio-economic status 1 and dropping out of high school is well known (e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999; Belley et al., 2008 , for the U.S. and Canada respectively). In Canadian data described below, teenage boys with two parents who are themselves high school dropouts have a 16% chance of dropping out, compared to a dropout rate of less than 1% for boys whose parents both have a university degree. However, despite the size and significance of the socio-economic gradient very little is understood about its determinants.
There are two obvious reasons why it is important to identify and measure the forces driving this strong cross-generational correlation. First, to the extent it is associated with higher ability individuals dropping out of high school, it may result in efficiency losses. Second, the nature of this correlation is crucial when thinking about redistribution, especially if it turns out to depend on elements beyond an individual's control or responsibility (see for example, Green, 2007) .
In rationalizing long-term educational outcomes, recent work by Heckman et al. (2006) ; Cunha and Heckman (2007, 2008) and Cunha et al. (2010) -hereafter, HSU, CH07, CH08, and CHS, respectively -has emphasized the role of cognitive and non-cognitive abilities. CHS investigate the dynamic production of cognitive and non-cognitive skills during childhood, up to age 14, finding that both intensity and timing of parental investments are crucial determinants of skill formation and, by extension, of high school graduation. 2 Yet, it is unclear whether socio-economic status, and parental education in particular, has any direct effect on dropping out. The observed correlation between parental education and dropping out might in fact be driven by differences in unobserved characteristics that are correlated with parental education, such as the cognitive and non-cognitive skills discussed in the literature. We use a factor-based model of education choice to assess the relative importance of observed and unobserved factors in shaping the observed socio-economic gradient. Our work confirms and quantifies the relevance of cognitive and non-cognitive skills, but it also identifies and measures a third unobserved and orthogonal factor, which we interpret as parental valuation of education.
Our empirical approach builds on the factor model presented by Carneiro et al. (2003) - hereafter, CHH. We implement a flexible version of the CHH model and explicitly account for non-linearities in skill production by allowing the distributions of skills and parental valuations to vary in shape, as well as location, with parental education. Non-linearities may reflect socio-economic differences in endowments and investments, meaning that teenagers from highly educated families and those from less educated families may be drawing from different ability and parental valuation distributions. We show that these 'conditional' distributions differ in their mean values as well as in their shape and we argue that accounting for such differences has significant impacts on our estimates for both observed and unobserved factors.
We use the 'Youth in Transition Survey' (YITS), a rich longitudinal dataset surveying a sample of over 20,000 Canadian teenagers. All youth were given the PISA reading aptitude test at age 15 (in the year 2000) and were then re-interviewed every two years thereafter. The key dependent variable is whether the child is a high school drop-out (i.e., is no longer in school and has not graduated) at age 19. We focus on the high school drop-out decision partly because it has important implications for lifetime outcomes of youth 3 and partly because, with a zero direct cost of staying in high school, it allows us to focus on issues other than the possibility of liquidity constraints. The latter is central to discussions of educational choices beyond high school but its presence can obscure investigation of other factors, particularly relating to parental influences, that are more cleanly isolated in our context.
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The YITS also includes surveys of a parent and of a school administrator when the child is 15. It contains a long list of questions related to individual characteristics often seen as reflecting non-cognitive abilities, as well as questions related to peers, the home environment and aspirations. Factor models provide an ideal vehicle for examining data of this type, which consist of many noisy measures of individual characteristics. We set out a system containing a dropout indicator function augmented by a set of measurement equations related to key underlying factors, interpreted as cognitive ability, non-cognitive ability, and parental valuation of education.
Identification of the impacts of the factors in this class of models is obtained through covariance restrictions. Our model has much in common with those in Todd and Wolpin (2006) , CH07 and CHS. Unlike those papers, however, we are not interested in the evolution of skills prior to age 15 but rather in the dropout decision in the older teenage years taking the current stock of skills as given. Assuming, as is commonly done, a skills index sufficiency condition,
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we argue that our estimates of the impact of parental education and parental valuations can be interpreted as current effects. Our analysis, therefore, focuses on the teenage years and assesses the effect of factors beyond the stock of skills at age 15. We find that, while much of the socioeconomic gradient occurs because the children of less educated parents draw from different skills distributions, a third factor, orthogonal to conventional cognitive and non-cognitive skills, plays a crucial role in explaining high school drop-out behaviour. The third factor is constructed to be correlated with measures of parental aspirations for their children's education and of their willingness to save for that education (after conditioning on the family income level). Thus, it is a factor related to parental valuation of education as revealed in parental statements and actions. 6 After accounting for distributional differences in the three factors, we find that the socio-economic gradient is eliminated: parental education has a negligible effect on dropping out, both economically and statistically. The highest ability students are predicted never to drop out regardless of parental education or parental valuation of education. However, parental valuation of education has a substantial impact on teenagers with medium and low cognitive ability. A low cognitive-ability teenager has a probability of dropping out of approximately .03
if his parents place a high value on education but .36 if their valuation is low. Non-cognitive ability has smaller impacts than either of these other factors.
The message of this paper is that, while important, skills development (cognitive or non-cognitive) is not the exclusive channel through which socioeconomic status operates. Equalizing skills would only eliminate the socio-economic gradient at the top of the cognitive skills distribution. In our data, children with median skills are far less likely to drop out of high school if their parents place a high value on education. This result points to a potential inefficiency as children with identical levels of ability may be more or less likely to complete school depending on their parents' characteristics and inclination. Overall, the relevant characteristic is not parental education but rather unobserved heterogeneity in how much a parent values education.
We view these results as hopeful in the sense that they suggest we might affect dropout rates in ways other than the slow, cross-generational process of raising parental education and early skill development. Instead, policy could focus on replicating whatever it is that high valuation parents do for their children. This points to the importance of studies looking at what high and low educated parents do differently, as for example Carneiro et al. (2007) .
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a brief discussion of previous literature.
In Section 3.1, we present a simple life-cycle model describing the decision to drop out from high school. In Section 4 we map the model to data, setting out an estimable counterpart. In Section 5 we describe the data, and Section 6 contains results from the estimator described earlier. In Section 7 we summarize and conclude.
Previous Literature
Our paper fits within a rich literature examining the high school dropout decision, particularly for the US. In papers dating back to the 1960s, researchers developed variants of what came to be called the 'Wisconsin Model' of educational and occupational attainment (e.g. Sewell et al., 1969; Alexander et al., 1975; Haveman et al., 1991) . A key element of this model was its emphasis on the development of educational aspirations during adolescence and the importance of parents and peers in shaping those aspirations. Parental aspirations for their children were seen to be of particular importance, see for example Davies and Kandel (1981) . Recent work by Attanasio and Kaufmann (2009) also suggests that parental expectations and influences have 7 In this paper, we do not investigate the channels through which parental valuation operates.
a non-negligible effect on early education decisions. We provide further evidence that parental aspirations are strongly correlated with dropping out of high school. However, the interpretation of these results is complicated. Parents' answers to questions (such as we use) about the level of education they 'hope' their child will attain could reflect their own valuation of education in general, or an assessment of their child's own capabilities, or some combination of the two. If they reflect the former, this would call for policy responses which can substitute for parental and family influences. If, instead, the answers reflect insider knowledge about a child's own abilities, then policies should focus on how to generate those abilities in the first place. We address this central identification problem using the factor model approach and provide a clear statement of the conditions under which our estimator permits identification of the causal impact of parental valuations on children's dropping-out.
Within the more recent economics literature, Eckstein and Wolpin (1999) use a structural dynamic choice framework to examine dropping out in the US. They find that dropouts have lower ability and motivation as well as lower expectations about rewards from graduation. Todd and Wolpin (2006) investigate the form of the production function for cognitive skills using data from the NLSY79 Children Sample, focusing on implications for racial gaps in test scores. They find that mother's ability (as measured by the AFQT test) has a large impact on test score outcomes.
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Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing on the unobserved channels through which socio-economic status operates. We distinguish between parents' aspirations, which include insider knowledge of ability, and parental valuations, which are orthogonal to skills measured at age 15. This distinction means that we can, under certain assumptions, test whether parents' education and the value they place on their children's education has direct effect on children's behavior during their teenage years.
8 They also use home environment indexes which vary by age and which are built on answers to survey questions such as, whether the parents read to their child, how many books the child owns, whether the child has a musical instrument, and more.
3 Determinants of dropping out 3.1 A simple decision problem
In this section, we set out a model of the decision to drop out of high school in an inter-temporal optimizing framework. Teenagers are assumed to make the dropout decision rationally based on expected returns given their levels of ability and their information on the returns to education.
We recognize that modeling teenagers as rational, forward-looking agents may stretch credulity to some extent so we also modify the model to allow parents to enforce a minimum effort level.
Our goal is to use the model to illustrate key issues in dropout determination and to obtain guidance for setting up and interpreting our empirical specifications.
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In setting out the model, we divide individual lives into three periods, numbered from zero to two. The middle, or teenage, period (period 1), corresponds to the time after the legal school leaving age (16 in most Canadian provinces in our sample period) and before the typical graduation age (18). The dropout decision is made in this period and we model it as conditional on the ability the teenager has accumulated in period 0 (i.e., up to age 15) and on expected returns to high school graduation in the future (period 2). We assume that the student does not make optimizing decisions in period 0 but we begin with a description of that period because assumptions related to the generation of ability in that period are relevant for the interpretation of our estimates.
Period 0: The 'shaping' of teenagers
We assume that a child is endowed with an ability vector, θ 0 , at birth. The vector has two elements, corresponding to cognitive and non-cognitive ability and is determined by,
where f 1 (., .) is a (possibly non-linear) function, θ F is a (2 × 1) vector of hereditary cognitive and non-cognitive abilities characterizing a family and ι is a vector of individual-specific traits which are randomly assigned.
Ideally, we would like to separately account for the impact of youth's ability and observable parental characteristics, such as education, on the drop-out decision. However, this is complicated by:
1. The fact that parental education is likely a function of θ F . Indeed, we will assume that parental education (PE) is determined as,
where ν p corresponds to parental valuations of the return to education and η summarizes all factors contributing to P E which are orthogonal to θ F and ν p .
2. The ability we observe in the data -ability at the start of the teenage period, denoted as θ 1 -will itself be a function of parental inputs. In particular, we assume it is a function of θ 0 , of parental education (either because it reflects family income effects or because hours of parental time from educated parents are more effective in generating children's ability) and of parental valuation of education (because it helps determine how much effort parents invest in improving their child's ability). That is,
where, following CH07 and CHS, it is possible that cognitive ability at age 15 is a function of both endowed cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, and the same is true for age 15 non-cognitive ability.
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We treat the dropout decision in the teenage years as conditional only on the actual value of θ 1 , not on the specific combination of innate ability and family inputs that generated that value.
If we assume, in addition, that there are no further factors that are both relevant for education decisions and a function of ν p and PE, then the vector θ 1 is a sufficient statistic for all the 10 In the empirical section of the paper, we treat υ p as orthogonal to θ 1 . It is clear from (3) that this treatment depends on the timing of the economic decisions. From the point of view of a teenager, θ 1 is taken as given and does not change with υ p . It is worth emphasizing that the impact of υ p which we estimate is not the total effect, but the partial effect holding θ 1 constant. education related decisions that were made before the teenage years. Under these assumptions, the estimated effects of parental education and ν p are interpreted as effects not already reflected in θ 1 , that is, as new effects on the dropout decision after age 15.
Periods 1 and 2: The Dropout Decision and After
In period 1, a teenager has two options: study toward a high school degree or work at the market wage for dropouts (denoted as wage w LHS ).
11 In period 2 (representing the remainder of life), dropouts earn w LHS . The period 2 earnings for graduates are higher and we will assume they are determined by,
where grd is a measure of academic performance, α p 0 and α 2 are scalars and α 1 is a vector.
The superscript 'p' in w p 2 indicates that the above equation represents a prediction conditional on the information available to the teenager and his or her family. We allow the information about market returns to differ across families and youths, by specifying,
where v p corresponds to parental predictions about returns to education. 12 Thus, children's notions of the returns to education increase with their parents perceptions of the same. Parental education is included on the assumption that more educated parents may have better information on the returns to education (Junor and Usher, 2003) . Note that while this specification incorporates predictions about future returns, the model still doesn't have any important uncertainty -each family acts as if it knows the returns to education; it's just that what they claim to know differs across families.
The academic performance measure in equation (4) is determined by,
11 To simplify discussion we assume that w LHS is the minimum wage and, therefore, is not a function of a person's abilities.
12 Such returns can be also non-pecuniary, and pertain to the perception that education is a 'good' in itself.
where, the ψ's are parameters or vectors of parameters as required. Thus, academic performance is potentially determined by school inputs, x s , the child's abilities, his or her effort level, e, and by parental inputs determined by P E and ν p . The combination of (4) and (6) implies that the return to effort in school comes in the form of higher earnings in period 2. We do not explicitly model the related choices and outcomes in period 2 but differences could arise, for example, if higher grades raised the probability of going to university, with its attendant higher earnings.
Equation (4) can be seen as a linearization of such processes. 
Utility
We assume linear utility of consumption U (c) = c, in order to focus on perceived pay-offs.
Effectively, an agent chooses a consumption level c t in each period t ∈ {1, 2} by choosing whether or not to stay in school in period 1. Labour is inelastically supplied in each period. The labour endowment in the second period, n, reflects the expected length of working life after age 18. Labour income is consumed in full during each period and agents have no means of transferring wealth between the two periods, with the noticeable exception of completing education. We assume that student consumption in period 1 is based on transfers from their parents determined by a combination of parental permanent income, P I, and current family income F I. This allows transitory income shocks to have an impact on education decisions as one might expect in the presence of credit constraints (Coelli, 2009 ). 14 Students optimally choose 'schooling effort' e, which has an impact on their future earnings. Effort affects utility negatively and, for convenience, we assume that it enters utility additively through a general function g(e) = − γe + 1 2 e 2 , with −γ > 0 being a minimum level of effort. We assume that minimum effort level is a positive function of ν p , implying that even myopic students may supply enough effort to graduate if their parents value education highly, perhaps because they gain utility from parental kudos. 
Empirical Specification for the Dropout Decision
The decision of whether to drop out from high school is determined by the difference between the lifetime utilities associated with dropping out and graduating, evaluated at the optimal effort level. Lifetime utility for an agent who does not drop out can be written as
where f S (P I, F I) is a function of parental permanent income and current income denoting consumption by a youth while in school, and β is the discount factor. Given the objective functions and constraints, we can easily show that the optimal effort of a student is
Optimal effort is a function of patience and expected working life of an agent, as well as of the importance of effort in determining schooling outcomes. It will also be affected by parental valuations of the returns to education and peer characteristics through their impacts on γ.
Lifetime utility for an agent who drops out of high school in period 1 is simply
where f W (P I, F I) summarizes consumption transfers to a dropout youth in period 1.
When deciding whether to drop out (d = 1) or not (d = 0), an agent examines the difference between V S (e * ) to V W , where V S (e * ) is the value of staying in school while providing the optimal effort, e*. Assuming that f S (·) and f W (·) are linear and that parental permanent income, P I, can itself be approximated as a linear function of parental education, this difference is given by,
where, θ 11 and θ 12 correspond to cognitive and non-cognitive ability, respectively, and u 0 is an error term that incorporates an idiosyncratic component of current utility as well as any added randomness associated with the grade function and second period earnings for graduates. This index function completely determines dropping out, with d=1 iff I D > 0, and it is the basis of our estimation. Notice that because we have substituted in for optimal effort, variables such as hours of studying do not belong in the index.
Our main interest is in estimating γ 2 , or the direct impact of parental education on dropping out. Based on the model, that coefficient reflects an effect of parental education on grades attainment and on the student's evaluation of returns to education as well as proxying for family permanent income effects. Assuming a summary index type model (i.e., one in which θ 1 fully captures all factors relevant for the dropout decision from before age 15), this coefficient captures those effects going forward from age 15. Thus, if parental education only affects ability generation for young children then it would help determine θ 1 but γ 2 = 0. Estimation of (10) is complicated by the fact that we do not directly observe θ 11 , θ 12 or ν p . In the next section, we present a series of empirical approaches to address this problem, using the model to help interpret what we obtain from each approach.
Empirical Strategies
The simplest approach to estimating (10) is to ignore θ 1 and ν p and implement (10) as a simple
Probit without including measures of these factors. However, the discussion about Period 0 indicates that P E will be correlated with both θ 1 and ν p and, as a result, the estimated P E coefficient will reflect the effects captured in γ 2 plus unobserved ability and parental education preference effects.
One possible response to this identification problem is to introduce a proxy for each of the unobserved factors. To understand the issues with this approach, consider a simplified example where dropping-out depends only on cognitive ability. Test scores are commonly used as proxies for cognitive ability. Our data includes results for students taking the PISA tests at age 15 (which we describe in more detail in the data section). Assume that the test score is generated according to,
where, P ISA is the PISA test score. In this equation, and the other measurement equations that follow, the δs and λs are either parameters or vectors of parameters, as required, and the u's are error terms which are assumed to be independent of covariates, the factors and the error terms in all other equations. Equation (11) says that the test score is a true reflection of cognitive skills at age 15, observed with error.
16 Equation (11) embodies an assumption that the student's test score is not determined by effort, parental inputs, peer effects, etc, except to the extent that they have shaped the student's ability on the test day, θ 11 . This is an important identifying assumption in the factor estimators we employ. We discuss it more later and provide some supporting evidence.
Consider estimating a regression specification for dropping-out that includes PISA as a proxy for θ 11 . To derive such a specification, we can solve (11) for θ 11 and substitute the result into (10).
The resulting specification will include PISA as a covariate but u 1 , the error term determining PISA, will also appear in the error term of the new specification. Thus, estimates will be inconsistent. In particular, the coefficient on P E will still reflect ability effects to the extent that the part of ability not fully captured in the test score is correlated with P E. We can address the problem in this example, and obtain consistent estimates, if we have a second proxy for θ 11 and use it as an instrument for PISA in the drop-out equation (Chamberlain, 1977) . This is a reflection of the key point made by CHH that we can obtain consistent estimates if we have at least two proxies related to each factor. In fact, one can demonstrate in our simple single factor example that the CHH systems estimator and the IV estimator using one proxy as an instrument for the other are equivalent. The CHH systems estimator goes further in allowing consistent estimates in the presence of multiple unobserved factors and, since that is our situation, we employ their estimator to obtain the main results in this paper. We also present some initial results using the simple proxy estimator. We view the latter as essentially a reduced form way to characterize the main patterns in the data, allowing the reader more direct insight into the variation we are using than is easily obtainable from the systems estimator.
Like many panel datasets, the YITS includes a large set of background variables, with the number expanded by the fact that parents and children are asked separate sets of questions. CHH propose using extensive sets of variables such as these to construct a system of measurement equations in the spirit of factor analysis to identify and control for the effects of latent factors.
As just stated, we require at least two such measurement equations related to each factor, along with the main estimating equation, (10). This system is estimated jointly, imposing identifying covariance restrictions which we discuss below.
For the case of the cognitive ability factor, the first measurement equation we use is the one for the PISA score, (11). Another measurement of cognitive skills in the YITS is provided by students' grades reported at age 15. An expression for this can be obtained by substituting the expression for optimal effort into equation (6), yielding,
Specifying PISA as being related only to θ 11 (and not to θ 12 or ν p ) in (11) is a key identifying assumption which we view as justified by the fact that PISA is a one-time low stakes test.
Neither the parents nor the children would ever know their test scores and had very little to gain or lose from taking the test. As such, we assume the student's test score is not directly determined by effort, parental inputs, peer effects et cetera, except to the extent that they have shaped the student's ability on the test day, θ 11 . In contrast, grades are potentially influenced by non-cognitive skills and parental valuations because, for example, teachers may reward noncognitive skills or high valuation parents may help children with their home work and equation (12) allows for those effects.
To provide supporting evidence for our assumption that PISA scores are a function of only θ 11 while grades depend on ability and parental valuations we estimate versions of (11) and (12) using proxies in place of the factors. The results from these regressions are reported in Appendix Table C1 . In addition to the PISA reading scores, we also have PISA math scores for half of the students and PISA science scores for the other half. We first regress PISA math scores on reading scores, and parents' aspirations for their children's education, a proxy for parental valuations of education, as well as controls for family characteristics and non-cognitive skills. If cognitive skills can be summarized by a single index, then after controlling for the reading score, parental aspirations should have no impact on the PISA math scores. As expected, parental aspirations are not significantly related to the math test scores, when reading scores are held constant. Children whose parents hope they will attend university score only 2 points higher on the PISA math test when compared to similar children whose parents have lower educational aspirations. To put this in context, the mean math score is 545 and the standard deviation is 80 points. For comparison, we also regress the students' grade 10 math grades on PISA reading scores and parental aspirations. In this regression, parental aspirations do have a significant effect. On average, math grades are 4.24 points higher, which is almost one third of standard deviation, among children whose parents have university aspirations for them. We get similar results when we repeat this exercise using PISA science tests and science grades.
Choosing measurements for the non-cognitive element in the ability vector is complicated by the fact that non-cognitive abilities are heterogeneous and difficult to reduce to one factor. Borghans et al. (2008) argue for classifying these abilities into the Big Five factor scheme favored by some psychologists. However, they also present evidence that among the Big Five factors 'conscientiousness' is strongly related to education outcomes while several of the others are not.
Rather than try to extract a factor from a disparate set of questions, we restrict ourselves to questions related to conscientiousness. Conscientiousness is associated with being achievement oriented, self-disciplined and confident. As a primary proxy for this, we use a question asking students how often the statement, "I do as little work as possible. I just want to get by" is true for them. 17 We code a variable equaling 1 if they answer 'Never' and assume this is determined by an underlying index function,
Whether a child provides only the minimum effort depends on their level of conscientiousness 17 The YITS dataset includes also a self-efficacy index which is potentially useful since self-efficacy is related to Conscientiousness. However, the questions underlying this index relate to whether the student thinks he or she can do well on tasks at school, which appears to be as much a self-assessment of cognitive abilities as a measure of self-efficacy.
(θ 12 ) but also on parental valuation of education since parents who value education highly may pressure children to do more than the bare minimum. Following CH08 and CHS, we assume that the current value of this measurement variable reflects only non-cognitive ability, θ 12 , though cognitive abilities may have been an input into the production of θ 12 itself in the past.
Our second measure of non-cognitive ability is based on a question asking the student whether she completes her assignments. This is related to the organization and goal-oriented dimensions of conscientiousness. We specify the index function determining this variable as,
where we have again assumed parents have an effect on achieving education related outcomes such as handing in homework.
As a measure for ν p , we use a variable built from parents' responses to a question about the level of education they hope their child will achieve. We will call that variable parasp and assume it is determined according to,
The aspirations that parents' hold for their children's education are clearly a function of the child's ability, which is reflected in (15). It is worth emphasizing that nu p is by construction orthogonal to both components of θ 1 . This presupposes that parents' valuation of education is separable from their child's ability. One might think of ν p as the answer a parent might give to the aspiration question before their child was born. Put another way, if parents had 'insider information' about their children's abilities, that knowledge would not be reflected in ν p (unless there were other unobserved skills that are orthogonal to θ 11 and θ 21 ). In the results section we present direct evidence that estimates of ν p are uncorrelated with other measures of skills.
The second measure of parental valuations is an equation corresponding to parents' answers to a question about whether they have saved for their child's future education. We use this as a dummy variable the value of which is determined by an underlying index function,
Thus, holding family income constant, parents who value education more highly will likely save for their children's education. As with the parasp variable, savings behavior may partly reflect parents' information about child's ability.
Together, equations (10) through (14) constitute a system in which the dropout process is specified jointly with measurement equations that help identify the role of abilities and parental education value factors. CHH discuss the conditions under which one can obtain identification for all the factor loadings on θ 11 , θ 12 and ν p in these equations as well as the parameters which define the distributions for θ 11 , θ 12 and ν p . In particular, in our system we obtain identification if one of the measurement equations includes only one of the factors. This condition is satisfied by the P ISA equation, which plausibly includes only the θ 11 factor. We also need to normalize one of the loadings for each factor to one. We set λ T θ1 (the loading on θ 11 in the P ISA equation), λ sυ (the loading on ν p in the saved equation) and λ cθ2 (the loading on θ 12 in the hmwork equation)
to one. With these restrictions and assuming the factors are mean zero and orthogonal to one another, we have 17 parameters related to the factor distributions to identify (counting the factor loadings that have not been normalized to one plus the variances of the factors). We have 19 unique covariances which are allowed to be non-zero in the structure among the errors of the dropout equation and the 6 measurement equations. 18 Thus, the order condition for identification is met. The rank condition corresponds to whether the specific pattern of entry of factors in the various equations allows us to recover all 17 parameters. This is indeed the case.
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We estimate the parameters using maximum likelihood, specifying the factors as having discrete distributions. Conditional on specific values for the factors, an individual's contribution to the likelihood function is just the product of normal CDF evaluations (since all the dependent variables are actually discrete). This product is calculated for each possible combination of values for the factors, then these factor-conditional products are each multiplied by the associated probability of observing that set of factor values and then summed. 20 The factors provide a 18 As CHH discuss, identification of the coefficients on the observable variables is given and so we can discuss identification of the factor loadings and variances in terms of the dependent variables net of the effects of the right hand side variables -i.e., the broadly defined errors in all the equations.
19 A document demonstrating a solution is available upon request. 20 We discuss the likelihood function in Appendix B.
flexible way to link the various equations, representing the joint distribution as a flexible mixture of normals. Maximizing the likelihood function provides estimates of the γ and δ vectors as well as the factor loadings (λ s), and the locations of the points of support and the associated probabilities for the factor distributions. Most importantly, assuming that equations (1) The assumption that all relevant equations are linear in the underlying factors is potentially strong. In particular, the results in Gallipoli et al. (2009) and CHS suggest that the relationship between parental and child ability is non-linear. To understand the implication of these non-linearities for our estimation, note that we are interested in characterizing the conditional distribution,
where Y is the matrix of outcomes (both dropping out and the measurement values), θ is a vector containing all the factors, and Γ is the matrix of all parameters in the system, including those defining the factor distributions. Our problem relates to the impact of parental education (PE) so we have written the probability as conditional upon PE but suppressed other covariates.
If the factor generation equations (1)- (3) are linear then the shape of the factor distribution is the same for all values of PE and we can write the likelihood with the factor distribution estimated unconditional on PE, i.e., using p(θ; Γ). This is the form of the standard version of this estimator.
However, if, for example, θ 1 is a nonlinear function of PE then the correct specification of the likelihood function is given in (17) with the factor distribution being conditional upon PE. If this is the case, but we implement the more standard version of the estimator, then the effect of PE in determining the shape of the θ distribution could be reflected in the coefficient on PE in the dropout and measurement equations.
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21 To verify this, we constructed a Monte Carlo exercise in which we generated values for a single factor and for PE based on equations (1)-(3). We then generated values for dropping out based on an index expressed as a linear function of PE and the factor and also generated values for two proxies for the factor, measured with error. When we specify (1)-(3) as linear equations we find: 1) a proxy estimator using one of the proxies resulted in estimates of the coefficient on PE in the dropout equation that were biased upward from their true value; 2)
To address this issue, we specify and implement an 'extended' factor estimator in which the points of support for the factor distributions are the same for every observation but the probabilities associated with those points are allowed to differ by parental education. Restricting the points of support to be the same for each observation does not constrain the distributions because the probability weights can adjust to accommodate any differences in the distributions' moments. This introduces an additional channel for parental education to affect dropping out: in principle, two students with the same abilities and parental valuation might have similar probabilities of dropping out even if their parents have very different education levels. Notice, however, that their 'ex-ante' probabilities of having those factor values could be very different. The different probability weights are identified by the extent to which the distributions of our factor-related measures do something other than simply shift proportionally when parental education changes.
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Data
We use data from the Youth in Transition (YITS) survey. The YITS is a longitudinal survey that tracks the experiences of two cohorts of Canadian youth. It provides a rich panel of information on the participants' demographic background, their participation in education and work, as well as their beliefs, attitudes and behaviours. The youngest cohort was 15 years old when the first cycle of data was collected in 2000. Because schooling is legally required for age-15 children, we use data from this cohort. The first cycle of data therefore provides a means to characterize a 'baseline'. In the YITS, participants are surveyed every two years. We also use data from the second and third cycles when the youth were 17 and 19 years-old. We focus on boys in this paper because the fraction of girls who drop out of high school in this data is very low. Reduced both an IV-type estimator in which we used the second proxy as an instrument for the first and the standard system estimator generated unbiased estimates of the coefficient on PE. However, when we allowed (1)-(3) to be nonlinear, the proxy, IV, and standard system estimator all produced upwardly biased estimates of the PE coefficient.
22 We have also extended the basic estimator by allowing the factors to be correlated rather than orthogonal. This is in the spirit of 'oblique' factor models used in other parts of the social sciences and is something allowed in CH08 and CHS. The conclusions from the estimates with this specification are not substantially different from those in which the factors are assumed to be orthogonal. Because orthogonality allows easier interpretation, we present our results using that specification and omit the correlated factor estimates to save on space.
form results for girls are available from the authors.
The original sample of 29,687 students was drawn from a two-stage sampling frame. Schools were sampled first from a list compiled by provincial Ministries and Departments. 23 In the second stage, students were sampled within the 1,187 schools. 24 The sample size within each school was chosen to facilitate school-level analysis. Because some provinces and linguistic groups were over-sampled, the within-school sampling rate ranged from less than 10 percent to a census of the 15 year-olds. In all of the results we report, we use weights provided by Statistics Canada that account for over-sampling, non-response to the parental survey, and longitudinal attrition.
Approximately, 13 percent of the sample is lost due to non-response to the parental survey. The overall response rate to the third cycle was 66 per cent. Some cases were also lost due to missing data or invalid responses to questions. The final sample is 7,755 boys.
The YITS is useful, in part, because it includes a parents' survey completed by the parent or guardian who identified him or herself as 'most knowledgeable' about the child. The responding parent provided data about their and their partner's education, work, and income. Parents also answered questions about their attitudes toward and aspirations for their children.
At the time of the survey, the children also completed a reading test which was administered through the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). PISA was an effort, coordinated by the OECD, to generate internationally coherent measures of cognitive skills. We use data from the PISA reading cohort.
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We identify individuals as high school dropouts if, according to their self-report, they had not completed the requirements for a high school diploma and were not in school at the time of the Cycle 3 survey. The third wave of the YITS data was conducted between February and June 2004, when respondents were all age 19. In most provinces, this corresponds to the spring of the year following their normal graduation year with two notable exceptions. The first is Ontario, 23 Schools were sampled from within the strata of province, age-15 enrollment size, linguistic group, public vs. private funding sources, and urban vs. rural settings.
24 Schools were excluded from the sample if fewer than 3 students were present or likely to respond to the survey. Schools for children with severe learning disabilities, schools for blind and deaf students and schools on First Nations reserves were also excluded.
25 While the YITS project also includes science and math skills tests, we use reading scores because the sample is twice as large. All of the students wrote the reading test, and half wrote either the math or science test.
where there was an option for students to stay in school for an extra year (grade 13), allowing them more time to complete courses that would prepare them for university. For students born in the first half of the year, some could still be in school without ever having an interruption in their schooling at the time of the cycle 3 interview. These would have to be students who have not already dropped out or chosen to graduate after 12 years, are in the last terms of high school, and are likely interested in attending university. Thus, it seems unlikely that many of them will ultimately be dropouts. The other exception is Quebec where high school ends at grade 11 and students interested in university then go to two-year preparatory schools called CEGEPS.
We re-estimated our reduced form and proxy specifications after dropping all observations from Ontario or Quebec 26 and obtained very similar results to those presented here. Thus, we do not believe these two anomalies are driving any of our results.
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The unconditional dropout rates at age 19 in this data using our dropout definition are .055
for boys and .036 for girls. These compare with numbers from the OECD showing that 11 per cent of 20 to 24 year old Canadians (both genders combined) have not completed high school and are not currently in school (de Broucker P., 2005) . Our rates could be lower than the OECD numbers, in part, because some students who have not yet graduated at age 19 but are still in school will ultimately drop out, causing the dropout rate to be higher in the 20 to 24 year old age window in the OECD data. Belley et al. (2008) also use YITS data and find that at the fourth (age 21) wave, the dropout rate for both genders combined is .07. We focus on dropping out at age 19 because we believe it provides a clearer picture of the role of family supports on the dropout decision and because it reduces the amount of sample attrition we face. Lower dropout rates in the YITS could also relate to dropouts being more likely to attrite from the sample.
Sample weights used in all of our calculations are supposed to account for this but may not do 26 It was possible to do this without the resulting sample being too small to use because the YITS strongly under-sampled Ontario and Quebec.
27 Our dropout definition differs from the one used by some other authors (e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin, 1999 ) who include current students who have not graduated as dropouts. We view counting these on-going students as dropouts as a potential mis-labeling that could cause us to miss relationships such as parents pushing their children to complete their schooling in "whatever time it takes." We re-estimated our model using Eckstein and Wolpin's definition and found similar results to those presented here with the main exception that the importance of parental valuation of education is somewhat reduced, though still economically substantial and statistically significant. so completely.
28 Finally, to place Canada's experience in context, Belley et al. (2008) 
Results
We begin by quantifying the observed socioeconomic gradient in the data, before accounting for any unobserved heterogeneity. 29 We measure the socioeconomic gradient by estimating a probit model including a series of variables capturing socio-economic status of the child's family. Key among these variables are parental education and income. Income is defined as total beforetax family income including transfers, expressed in thousands of dollars, and put into adultequivalent form by dividing by the square root of the number of people in the family. Parental education is captured with a set of six categorical variables corresponding to the highest level of education achieved by both parents: 1) both parents are high school dropouts; 2) one parent is a high school dropout and the other is a dropout; 3) both parents are high school graduates; 4) both parents have a post-secondary education below the BA level or one has post-secondary education below the BA level and the other has a lower level of education; 5) one parent has a BA and the other has some lower level of education; and 6) both parents have at least a BA. Lone 28 Student attrition between cycles 1 and 2 and between cycles 2 and 3 implies that we have approximately 70% of the original sample with usable information by the third cycle. This is not an inordinately high attrition rate by the standards of most panel data. The weights provided to address this issue are essentially the outcome of an estimated attrition process. Thus, the variables used in constructing the weights can potentially play the role of exclusion restrictions. If there are variables used in constructing the weights that are not used in the final estimation then those variables effectively become instruments for addressing selection. The information we have obtained from Statistics Canada suggests that the variables used in constructing those weights are all variables that are either included in our final specifications or are strongly related to included variables. One exception to this is a variable based on a question to the parents about whether they were willing to have their data shared with another government department (HRDC). We tried, unsuccessfully, to get access to this variable to allow us to model attrition explicitly ourselves. Instead, we tried implementing an estimator including an explicit attrition process and using a variable equalling the proportion of times a respondent did not answer a question asked of everyone as an exclusion restriction. However, this variable did not perform well in determining attrition, especially for girls, and we were forced to abandon this approach and rely on the provided weights.
29 In all the specifications that follow we include (but do not report) province indicators. Standard errors are calculated incorporating clustering at the high school level in all specifications because of the nature of the sampling scheme. parent families are assigned to categories 1, 3, 4 or 6, depending on the parent's education. The sample means in Table C1 indicate that approximately 10 percent of the sample falls in each of categories 1 and 6. We also include a set of variables reflecting family structure, with indicators corresponding to lone parent families, two parent families in which both biological parents are present, and "other" two parent families which correspond, essentially, to step-parent families, and other family types (the omitted category is a two biological parent family). Lone parent families may face a 'poverty of time' and other stresses that affect school completion. We include a dummy variable for whether the person lives in a rural (as opposed to urban) location and a variable corresponding to the number of times the family has moved in the child's lifetime up to age 15. We would expect more moves to correspond to a weakening of social connections that may be important in school completion. Finally, we also include variables corresponding to whether the child is an immigrant and whether the youth is of aboriginal descent.
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We present the predicted probability of dropout by parental education in Figure 1 . We think of parental education as the best measure of family socioeconomic status for a number of reasons. We view parental education as related to permanent income of the family, therefore current income when controlling for parental education is something closer to transitory income.
An increase in income per adult equivalent for a family of 4 from $15,000 to $50,000 reduces the probability of dropping out by less than .01. This fits with results in Belley et al. (2008) indicating that while there are family income effects on educational attainment in Canada, they are not strong. In specifications where we do not control for parental education, the coefficient on family income is twice as large.
As the figure demonstrates, parental education is very strongly correlated with dropping out. Relative to a student both of whose parents have a BA or higher education (a person whose probability of dropping out is .007), a student both of whose parents are themselves 30 These variables are included because of evidence that recent immigrants are facing substantial barriers to integrating into the economy and society at large. The aboriginal descent variable is suggested by high rates of poverty in this community. In specifications not shown, we included indicators for whether the child is second generation (i.e., born in Canada with at least one parent who is an immigrant) and the language spoken at home is an official language. Because these variables were never significant or economically substantial in a variety of specifications we dropped them from the analysis.
high school dropouts has a .15 higher probability of dropping out. Youth whose parents have a high school diploma have a .05 higher probability of dropping out compared to those whose parents both have a BA. The main conclusion from the figure is that there is a steep gradient associated with parental education which points toward a calcification of educational differences across generations. Belley et al. (2008) show that dropout gradients with respect to parental education and family income are steeper in the US, but the evidence in this table indicates that inter-generational persistence is still an issue in Canada.
Next we turn to presenting some reduced form evidence of correlations between observed measures and dropping out of high school. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that the measures of skills and parental valuations that we use in the paper are strongly correlated with dropping out, while other measures such as peers and school characteristics are not related to dropping out after controlling for socio-economic status. In the first column of Table 1 
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We plot the predicted probabilities of dropping out (evaluated at the mean) for the various categories of PISA and parental aspirations in Figure 2 . These patterns are interesting in themselves. When boys scored in the top quartile on the PISA reading test they were very unlikely to drop out. For these boys, a change in parental aspirations is associated with a small and statistically insignificant change in the dropout probability. Boys who scored in the top PISA quartile and whose parents hoped they would achieve a university degree had less than a one percent chance (0.008) of dropping out, compared to a 3 per cent chance for similar boys whose parents expected a lower level of educational attainment.
31 Some parents responded 'Any level above high school'. These responses were coded as 0.
In the bottom three PISA quartiles, parental aspirations have significant impacts that increase in magnitude as we move lower in the PISA distribution. Figure 2 indicates that high parental aspirations not only reduce the likelihood of dropping out, but also flatten the gradient across the PISA quartiles. This happens in a non-linear way: the largest proportional reductions in dropping out occur for students in the 2nd and 3rd quartiles.
One way to put these results in context is to consider where, along the PISA distribution, the probability of dropping out is closest to the unconditional probability and how that differs by parental expectations. Overall, in the sample, .055 of boys drop out. Boys whose parents have low aspirations will drop out at the unconditional average rate only when they have reading scores in the third quartile. If a boy's parents expected him to obtain a university degree, his chances of dropping out are similar to the average if he is in the bottom quartile of the PISA distribution. The overall implication is that high parental aspirations have a powerful influence on teenage educational outcomes for children whose base (i.e., age 15) cognitive abilities lie in the lower three quartiles of the ability distribution.
It is worth noting that once PISA and parental aspirations are included in these reduced form estimates the socio-economic gradient falls by roughly half. The difference in the dropout probability between those with two BA parents and those with two dropout parents is .13 when just controlling for income, parental education and other socio-economic variables, but falls to .078 when also controlling for aspirations and PISA scores. This suggests that a substantial proportion of the parental education effects we estimated in the earlier specifications are masking the factors measured by the aspiration and PISA variables.
In column 2, we introduce the measure for non-cognitive skills that we described earlier, and which takes on the value one if a child said that he never wanted to 'just get by'. This variable, which measures conscientiousness, is significantly related to dropping out in the statistical sense, but the effect is small in magnitude. Never wanting to just get by reduces the probability of dropping out by .024. Moreover, the socio-economic gradient, as well as the gradients associated with PISA and parental aspirations are very similar after including this proxy.
In the next column of Table 1 , we add our second measure of non-cognitive skills (an indicator variable equalling one if the student reports he always completes his assignments) and two scale measures of non-cognitive skills (self-esteem and self-efficacy). Self-esteem is measured using the 10-item Rosenberg's self-esteem scale and captures the youths' global feelings of self-worth or self-acceptance (see Rosenberg, 1965) . Because this measures overall psychological well-being, we anticipate that its relationship to behavioral outcomes may be weak. The YITS includes a self-efficacy scale adapted from Pintrich and Groot (1990) which measures perceived competence and confidence in academic performance.
The results in column 3 indicate that self-esteem has no direct effect on dropping out, but self-efficacy has a significant impact, although a relatively small one. A one standard deviation increase in self-efficacy reduces the probability of dropping out by .01. The third column also shows that children who complete their assignments are less likely to drop out by a margin of .024. Including this second measure of conscientiousness reduces the effect of the 'getby' variable, suggesting that these two measures are highly correlated.
Inclusion of self-efficacy, self-esteem and the homework indicator does not affect the socioeconomic gradient but does reduce the impact of parental aspirations and PISA scores. As we mentioned earlier, the self-efficacy scale likely also captures cognitive ability. For example, one question included in the scale asks students to indicate how frequently this statements is true: 'I'm confident I can understand the most complex material presented by the teacher'. This, along with the correlation between parents' aspiration and PISA, would explain why including self-efficacy in column 3 reduces the PISA-aspirations gradient. Nonetheless, the PISA and aspirations gradients remain steep.
In column 4, we include sets of variables corresponding to choices made by the students. The first set consists of indicator variables corresponding to whether all of the respondent's close friends: think completing high school is very important; skip classes once a week or more; have dropped out of high school; are planning to attend post-secondary education; have a reputation for causing trouble; smoke cigarettes; think it's okay to work hard at school. These variables capture a combination of risky behaviours and attitudes toward schooling among friends. 32 We also include dummy variables for whether the youth has a dependent child and for whether the individual smoked at least weekly at age 15. The coefficients on these variables indicate liitle or no association between dropping out and peer behaviour but some significant associations with having a dependent child and smoking. But more importantly for us, introducing the peer, dependent child and smoking variables has very little impact on the socio-economic gradient impact estimates, though it does generate a reduction in the size of the aspiration/PISA effects. The latter effect indicates that ability and parental aspirations are correlated with risky behaviours such as smoking and sexual activity. We recognize that selection and endogeneity concerns complicate the interpretation of the coefficients on the set of variables introduced in column 4 and so do not include them in the remaining specifications. But whatever their own effects, their inclusion does not alter our main conclusions about the socio-economic gradient and its relationship to aspirations and ability.
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In the final column of Table 1 , we incorporate school characteristics that were reported by the high school administrators as a part of the first wave of the YITS survey. We include a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the administrator reported that a lack of instructional material hindered the learning of grade 10 students to some extent or a lot. We also include the ratios of students to teachers, and students to computers. Because we have not addressed the endogenous selection of families into schools, one should not interpret these results as causal.
With that caveat in mind, the results in the fifth column do indicate that the student to teacher ratio in a school is correlated with dropping out for boys. Including school characteristics has essentially no effect on the socio-economic gradient and little impact on the PISA and parental aspirations effects. 34 The last column of Table 1 also includes the local youth unemployment rates, which reflect the relative attractiveness of the alternatives to school. Youth unemployment in this reduced form set-up does not appear to be correlated with dropping out.
and behaviours) to give these peer variables their maximum possible impact. 33 We also estimated specifications in which we included measures of hours of paid work for the students. None of the measures we examined entered significantly or changed our key estimated marginal impacts. Working is very common among Canadian youth, both during the school year and during the summer.
34 Non-response to the administrators survey significantly reduces the sample, as a result we do not include any of these school measures in the unobserved-factor models.
Given the findings of this section, in the remainder of the paper we examine the role of abilities and parental valuations in determining the socio-economic gradient without considering peer or school effects. This allows for a sharper focus on a set of relationships that, anyway, appear to be little or not at all affected by these effects.
Factor Estimators
In this section, we present results from the full factor model set out in Section 4. Recall that our goal with the basic factor model is to use the added measures of ability (cognitive and non-cognitive) and parental valuations available in the YITS to better control for these factors.
A key decision in implementing these models is the number of points of support in the estimated factor distributions. We first estimated the models with two points of support for each factor then added additional points. Adding a third point of support for the cognitive ability factor distribution significantly improved the fit of the model but adding a third point for the parental valuation and non-cognitive ability distributions, and a fourth point of support for cognitive ability, were not helpful.
35 Thus, we implement a specification with three points of support for cognitive ability and two each for parental valuation and non-cognitive ability. Table 2 reports the marginal impact of socio-economic background on the probability of dropping out estimated from two different factor models. In the first column, we present results from a model where the distributions of the three factors do not vary with parental education. In Section 4, we argued that the standard linear system of equations in a factor model may not be an accurate depiction of the ability generation and school attainment process. The second column of the table contains results from our extended system estimator which allows the distributions of the three factors to differ by parental education level. Note that this specification nests the more standard model as a special case. A likelihood ratio test rejects the restrictions that the factor probabilities not differ by parental education at any conventional significance level.
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In both columns of Table 2 , the impact of family income is essentially zero: notably smaller
35 Specifically, the model returned probability masses for the additional points of support which were very close to zero and imprecisely estimated.
36 Specifically, the test statistic is distributed as χ 2 (20) and takes a value of 977.59.
than the already small impacts in Belley et al. (2008) . The estimated effects from the constrained factor model are very similar in magnitude to the effects from reduced form estimates. For example, the difference in dropout rates between a teenager from a two BA family and a teenager from a two dropout family is .078 in a simple Probit model and .075 in the factor model.
The estimated marginal impacts from the extended factor model are given in the second column of Table 2 . Allowing the factor distributions to differ by parental education effectively eliminates the gradient with respect to parental education. The difference in the probability of dropping out relative to a boy from a BA-family is not statistically significant for any of the other parental education categories. The effect size is less than one percentage point for youth whose parents have a high school diploma. Under the index-sufficiency assumption discussed earlier, these results imply that, while parental education may influence the teenager's level of ability up to age 15, parents with higher levels of education do not impart anything more to their children after age 15 once we condition on their valuation of education.
Estimates of the factor loads, locations and associated probabilities are given in Table A2 .
The factor loads indicate that all three factors have statistically significant and sizeable effects on both the dropout and grades indexes. Interestingly, the child's non-cognitive ability factor does not have a significant effect in either measurement equation related to parental valuation (parasp and saved). The cognitive ability factor enters both equations significantly but the impact in the saved equation is small. Thus, at least for abilities we can measure, our measures of parental responses and actions relating to their valuation of education are not simply reflections of the child's abilities. To the extent this carries over to any other, unmeasured factors, this pattern implies that we really are capturing parental valuation of education rather than getting another measure of child abilities. Finally, the parental valuation factor is a significant determinant of the non-cognitive ability measures. Parents who value education induce their children to complete their assignments on time.
In Table 3 , we describe the joint impacts of parental education, ability and parental valuation of education by presenting fitted probabilities for each possible combination of the factors and parental education based on the estimates from our extended factor model. (The predicted probabilities shown in Table 3 are also shown in Figure 3 .) In particular, for a given level of parental education, we form a fitted probability by setting all other variables at their mean values and then using the estimated mass point location value for one of the two points in the parental valuation and non-cognitive factor distributions and one of the three points in the cognitive ability distribution. This yields 12 fitted probabilities for each education level. The top panel of Table 3 shows the fitted dropout probabilities evaluated at high non-cognitive ability and the bottom panel shows the same for low non-cognitive ability.
With few exceptions, high cognitive-ability teenagers do not drop out regardless of their parent's education or the values of the other factors. 37 For teenagers with low non-cognitive skills whose parents are high school dropouts and place low value on education, moving from high to low cognitive ability increases the probability of dropping out to .36. But parental valuation effects are nearly as large. A teenager with low cognitive and non-cognitive abilities whose parents place a high value on education has about a .03 probability of dropping out which means the impact of parents' valuations for a low-ability boy is .33. Moreover, a student whose parents place a high value on education has essentially a zero probability of dropping out unless he has both low cognitive and non-cognitive abilities, and even then his dropout probabilities are very low. In comparison, non-cognitive ability has effects that are substantial but less than either of the other two factors. Looking at the bottom right corner of the panels, increasing from low to high non-cognitive ability reduces the probability of dropping out by .17. This compares to reductions on the order of .3 from improving cognitive and parental valuation from the same starting point. Table 4A shows the estimated distribution of teenagers across the points of support for each of the factors and each parental education level. Table 4B shows the joint distributions. These tables show that teenagers whose parents both have a BA have high probability (.44) of having high cognitive ability and having parents who place a high value on education. In contrast, .41
37 Note that the small and insignificant differences in marginal impacts of parental education in Table 2 are converted into larger (though still statistically insignificant) differences in Table 3 because the curvature of the normal cumulative distribution function toward the tails converts small parameter differences into larger probability differences.
of teenagers from two dropout families are in the low cognitive ability -low parental valuation category and a further .24 are in the medium cognitive ability -low valuation category. Thus, raw comparisons of teenagers from these two types of families will capture the fact that the children in the two BA families are more able and have parents who care more about education.
The differences in ability reflect differences up to age 15. These could include inter-generational transmission of ability (equation 1) but could also include the type of early childhood investment effects stressed in recent papers by Heckman and co-authors (e.g. Heckman and Lochner, 2000; Cunha et al., 2010 ) (equation 3). Interestingly, non-cognitive ability does not show the same degree of correlation with parental education. In fact, teenagers whose parents both have a BA are less likely to have high non-cognitive skills. Roughly one third of the boys from BA families have high non-cognitive skills compared to about 46 percent of the boys whose parents are both dropouts.
It is difficult to summarize the impact of parents' valuations because the impacts are very different at different points of the ability distribution. However, we can gain some insight through a counterfactual experiment in which we predict the dropout probability for a boy whose parents are dropouts, attributing to him the parental valuation distribution of a BA-family and holding constant the distribution of his abilities. The counterfactual probability is only .037 compared to the actual predicted probability of .13 for a boy in a two dropout family.
An interesting implication of these results is that it is not parental education that matters for dropping out but parental valuation of education. That is, a child whose parents are both themselves dropouts has the same probability of dropping out as a child with the same ability from a highly educated family if his parents care as much about education as their more educated counterparts. In our data, what parents who care about education actually impart is a black box -they could devote more resources to their child's education, they might convince their child that there is a return to effort in school, or they might enforce effort of at least some minimal level.
The fact that parental education does not matter points away from resource based arguments since we would expect parental education to be correlated with family permanent income. Our results are in apparent agreement with Behrman and Rosenzweig (2002) 's estimates of the impact of variation in maternal education on children's educational outcomes holding constant family fixed factors (by using differences in education between twin mothers). But they find significant effects of paternal education. Carneiro et al. (2007) find significant effects of maternal education on grade retention in NLSY data when they instrument for maternal education using local labour market conditions and access to colleges when the mother was 17. To the extent that increasing parental education increases parental aspirations for their children's education (which Carneiro et al. (2007) find is the case), the estimated parental education effects identified by these papers may ultimately occur through the channel we identify.
Interpreting Parental Valuations
Our results would overstate the impact of parental valuations if dropping out were affected by some type of ability which is orthogonal to the PISA reading score and is correlated with parental valuations. This could happen for example if there were some other skills, orthogonal to the ones we measure, about which parents have private information.
The YITS includes PISA reading scores for all of the sampled children; however, half of the children also wrote the PISA science test and the other half wrote the PISA math test. The sample sizes are too small to use the science and math tests in the main analysis to estimate cognitive skills. However we can use these data to perform a simple but informative out of sample robustness check to verify: (i) whether our identifying assumption is sensitive to the choice of test scores; (2) whether the additional third factor, orthogonal to cognitive and non-cognitive skills, exhibits patterns of comovement with science and math PISA tests, which we have not used to identify θ 11 . Given the difficulty in interpreting unobserved factor models, this simple exercise can prove useful to help discard some possible interpretations of the third factor, especially those relating to private information of parents about unobserved skills or new cognitive skills which are possibly accumulated after age 15. Given that "hard" skills related to math and science are often viewed as quite different from "softer" reading related skills (with different people embodying high values of each, i.e., "math nerds" versus "creative writer" types), we view this test as quite informative.
Assuming that cognitive skills can be summarized with the PISA reading score implies that after conditioning on θ 11 , υ p should not predict either science or math skills. We test this implication using estimates of θ 11 and υ p from our factor model presented in the second column of Table A.2. Using the estimated parameters, the factor estimates are obtained by use of Bayes
where Y is the matrix of outcomes (both dropping out and the measurement values), θ is a vector containing all the factors, and Γ is the matrix of all parameters in the system, including those defining the factor distributions. Figure 7 shows the relationship between the estimated factors and the students' math scores.
Because the factors do not have a meaningful scale, we normalize both the estimated factors and the math scores. The left panel of Figure 7 shows the strong positive association between math scores and our estimates of cognitive ability. In the right panel, we relate the estimates of parental valuation (on the x-axis) with the residual variation in math scores after controlling for estimated cognitive ability. Graphically, it appears that parental valuations do not predict residual variation in math scores. The correlation, albeit significant, is tiny and negative. Figure   7 shows the same relationship using science scores where similar patterns can be observed. Based on this, we conclude that the parental valuation factor is not simply a reflection of other cognitive skills; at least, as captured by science and math measures not used in our estimation.
Conclusion
This paper attempts to provide insights into the strong correlation between parental education and schooling outcomes of their children. Such correlation suggests a calcification of educational inequalities that may result in social efficiency losses and/or lack of fairness in opportunities.
Understanding the sources of the correlation is, therefore, a necessary first step in deciding whether policy interventions are called for and, if so, what form they should take. The key empirical challenge is to decide whether the correlation reflects direct effects of parental education (perhaps because more educated parents are better able to help children with school work) or is actually capturing the influence of sources of heterogeneity that are typically unobservable, such as cognitive ability. Combining insights from earlier work such as Sewell et al. (1969); Davies and Kandel (1981) ; Todd and Wolpin (2006) ; Cunha and Heckman (2007) , we investigate the importance of three underlying factors in determining the propensity of teenagers to drop out of high school: cognitive abilities, non-cognitive abilities, and the value placed on education by the teenager's parents.
Our main empirical approach follows Carneiro et al. (2003) in using a main drop-out equation estimated jointly with a set of measurement equations comoving with the unobserved factors.
Given arguments in Cunha et al. (2010) that ability production functions may be non-linear in parental investments, we consider an extension to the estimator in Carneiro et al. (2003) in which the unobserved factor distributions are allowed to differ across families with different parental education, both in terms of shape and location. Implementing this unconstrained estimator results in four main findings. First, ability at age 15 has a substantial impact on dropping out.
The highest ability individuals are predicted never to drop out regardless of parental education or parental valuation of education. In contrast, the lowest ability teenagers have a probability of dropping out of approximately .36 if their parents have a low valuation of education. Second, parental valuation of education has a substantial impact on medium and low ability teenagers.
A low ability teenager has a probability of dropping out of approximately .03 if his parents place a high value on education but .36 if their educational valuation is low. Third, non-cognitive ability has impacts that are sizeable but much smaller than those of the other two factors.
Fourth, parental education has no direct effect on dropping out once we control for ability and parental valuation of education.
The interpretation of these results depends on the underlying economic structure. If we assume an index-sufficiency model in which cognitive and non-cognitive abilities at age 15 fully summarize all investments before that age which are relevant for subsequent dropout decisions then, once we include measures of those abilities, all other effects should be interpreted as being impacts of the relevant factors and characteristics after age 15. Thus, our results would indicate that both parental education and value put on education may influence abilities at age 15 (perhaps through impacts in early childhood) but only parental valuation of education has an effect beyond this.
Whether or not one accepts the assumption that cognitive and non-cognitive abilities at age 15 are sufficient statistics for everything that has gone before, two striking results remain:
first, only parental valuation of education (rather than parental education itself) matters in the dropout decision, once we control for abilities; second, the quantitative impact of parental valuation is very large. We view these results as hopeful for policy, since parental valuations of education seem potentially amenable to interventions which do not span over the very longterm, unlike targeting parental education itself. The set of policies that seem interesting given our results are ones which either educate the parents themselves (such as the Baby College program) or find ways to replicate the stimulation that high valuation parents provide for their children (such as expanded Big Brothers and mentoring programs, or extended hours in school or other care). Whichever way one interprets our results, it seems that parental valuation of education falls into the category of determinants of education (and through it, outcomes in later life) for which a youth cannot be held directly responsible and provides some justification for policy intervention. Source: Youth in Transition Survey, Cycle 3 (Cohort A) Weighted to account for non-response to the parents' survey and longitudinal attrition. Standard errors clustered by high school. *** indicates result is statistically significant at .01 level, ** at .05 level, * at .10 level Column 1 estimated from a model where the probability weights are independent across parental education. Column 2 estimated from a model where the probability weights differ across parental education. The reference person is a non-Aboriginal non-immigrant youth who lives in an urban area in Ontario, living with two biological parents who both have a Bachelors degree. Marginal effects are evaluated for a youth whose parents both have a high school diploma at the mean of all the other variables. 
B Likelihood Function
In this appendix, we present an example contribution to the factor likelihood function for person i who is a dropout; has a test score in the lowest quartile; has parents who state they hope their child gets a BA; states he just wants to get by in effort; has an average overall grade below 59;
has parents who saved for their education; and hands in homework late. hope their child will obtain a BA or more and zero otherwise), saved (which takes a value of one if the parents saved for their child's education), getby (which equals 1 if children say they just want to get by in terms of effort), and hmwork (which equals 1 if the child always completes his assignments). These variables contribute simple Probit type expressions to the likelihood conditional on the factor values. We divide the PISA test scores into quartiles and use indicators for the quartile of the P ISA variable. Thus, the contribution to the likelihood function is in the form of components of an ordered Probit. Here, P ISA 1 is the test score value that defines the upper bound of the first quartile. Similarly, we group grades in four categories (59 and less, 60 to 69, 70 to 79, and 80 and above). As a result, the contributions for this variable also take the form of ordered Probit expressions. Estimates are weighted to account for non-response to the parents' survey and longitudinal attrition. Standard errors clustered by high school. *** indicates result is statistically significant at .01 level, ** at .05 level, * at .10 level Grades are self-reported by the youth in grade 10. All specifications also include controls for family income, parental education, family background, province, non-cognitive skills, number of siblings and month of birth.
C Specification of PISA and Grades Equations
